Can Scientists Help Philosophers Regarding the Nature of Phenomenal Experience?
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Date
2020
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Forum Philosophicum- International Journal for Philosophy
Abstract
In response to Putnam’s computational hypothesis on the question
of the nature of the mind, Searle and Churchland argue that the nature of mental
states essentially consists of neurophysiological processes in an organic brain.
However, this seems to imply that mental states are products of the brain and
thus, contra Putnam, that an adequate account of mental states which excludes an
implementing organic structure is impossible. To this extent, an attempt is made in
the paper to structure a biological-organic program. By this structure, it is identified
that mental state is a process of the whole organism which necessarily produces
phenomenal experience. However, if phenomenal experience is a product of mental
states, which consists in neural firings in the brain, then it appears the problem
is reducible to a question of how; i.e. how does the brain do it? In turn, this may
direct our attention to neuroscientists. However, the paper argues that even perceptual internalism, which is the theoretical basis of contemporary neuroscience,
may not really be of help in this case. It is argued that the experimentation and
observation which foreground scientific enquiry may not be able to sufficiently
account for the how question without leaving some other questions unanswered.
As a result, a seemingly implied otherworldly reality or principle is explored. It is
submitted that our natural tendency and apparatus (what else do we have) do not
appear to lead us forward. Again, withdrawing back to our natural system, our
deficient human nature requires us to tread with caution but hopefully, perhaps,
we may eventually make progress in this regard.