Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy
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Date
2020
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Taylor and Francis
Abstract
The post-Cold-War collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex has
enabled the rapid global proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile
material, thereby escalating the possibilities of non-conventional
nuclear attacks. Such attacks have become more likely with the
emergence of very powerful terrorist groups like Boko Haram and
others around the world. Over 1,800 metric tons of nuclear material is
still stored in poorly secured facilities in more than 25 countries. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had
recorded in their trafficking database a total of 2,889 incidents
involving losses, thefts and attempts to traffic fissile material across
international borders. Boko Haram may also engage with radiological
or biochemical ‘dirty bombs’, which are easier to make. With no less
than 48 reported incidences of biochemical attacks since 1900, it is
likely that Boko Haram may switch tactics, especially considering the
lack of biochemical detection protocols in Nigeria’s counterterrorism
strategy and also the inconsistency in public and private sector
collaboration. This new reality calls for a recalibration of Nigeria’s
counterterrorism protocols to accommodate the anticipated threat.
The paper thus highlights policy considerations and advocates new
directions
Description
Keywords
Strategic Studies, Arms control